Currently, California has a 10-day waiting period on the delivery of firearms to the purchaser (Pen. Code §§ 26815(a) & 27540(a)). This applies to private party transfers through licensed dealers (Pen. Code § 27545), imposing the same delay. A review of the legislative history reveals that this 10-day waiting period is neither long-standing nor consistent in application. The legislature’s primary intent was to provide law enforcement time for background checks, driven by manual processes. The “cooling-off” intent to deter impulsive violence emerged only in the 1990s, falsely retroactively attributed via People v. Bickston (1979). With modern instant-check systems, these rationales are outdated.
Figure 1: A timeline chart visualizing California’s waiting period evolution from 1850 to present, highlighting no waits until 1923 (handguns: same-day prohibition), extensions to 3 days (1955), 5 days (1965), 15 days (1975), expansion to long guns (1990, 15 days, reduced to 10 in 1996), and standardization at 10 days for all firearms (1997). It shows handguns-only application until 1990 and erratic duration changes.
California gained statehood on September 9, 1850, via the Compromise of 1850. Four years later, it passed its first gun control law, prohibiting firearm and ammunition sales to Native Americans (Stats. 1854, c. 80, misdemeanor).
In 1909, California enacted Statutes 1909, c. 110, requiring retail pistol sellers to maintain a register of purchaser details (name, age, occupation, residence, pistol identification), open to peace officers:
Section 1: Every person engaged in the business of selling at retail pistols shall keep a register in which shall be entered the name, age, occupation, and residence (if residing in a city then the street number of such residence) of each and every purchaser of such pistols, together with the number or other mark of identification if any on such pistol, which said register shall be open to the inspection of all peace officers at all times.
Sec. 2. Every person violating any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall on conviction be fined a sum not to exceed 50 dollars, or in default of the payment of said fine shall be imprisoned in the county jail not to exceed one day for each two dollars of said fine.
In 1917, California expanded registration to include all concealable firearms (pistols, revolvers, or others with barrels <12 inches), requiring dealers to record detailed sales data and mail duplicates to local law enforcement or county clerks by day’s end:
Sec. 7. Every person in the business of selling, leasing or otherwise transferring a pistol, revolver, or other firearm, of a size capable of being concealed upon the person, whether such seller, lessor or transferor is a retail dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise, except as hereinafter provided, shall keep a register in which shall be entered the time of sale, the date of sale, the name of the salesman making the sale, the place where sold, the make, model, manufacturer’s number, caliber or other marks of identification on such pistol, revolver or other firearm. Such register shall be prepared by and obtained from the state printer and shall be furnished by the state printer to said dealers on applications at a cost of three dollars per one hundred leaves in duplicate and shall be in the form hereinafter provided. The purchaser of any firearm, capable of being concealed upon the person shall sign, and the dealer shall require him to sign his name and affix his address to said register in duplicate and the salesman shall affix his signature in duplicate as a witness to the signatures of the purchaser. Any person signing a fictitious name or address is guilty of a misdemeanor. The duplicate sheet of such register shall on the evening of the day of sale, be placed in the mail, postage prepaid and properly addressed to the board of police commissioners, chief of police, city marshal, town marshal or other head of the police department of the city, city and county, town or other municipal corporation wherein the sale was made; provided, that where the sale is made in a district where there is no municipal police department, said duplicate sheet shall be mailed to the county clerk of the county where the sale is made. A violation of any of the provisions of this section by any person engaged in the business of selling, leasing, or otherwise transferring such firearms is a misdemeanor. This section shall not apply to the wholesale dealers in their business intercourse with retail dealers, nor to wholesale or retail dealers in the regular or ordinary transportation of unloaded firearms as merchandise by mail, express or other mode of shipment, to points outside of the city, city and county, town or municipal corporation wherein they are situated. The register provided for in this act shall be substantially in the following form:
Original.
Dealers’ Record of Sale of Revolver or Pistol.
State of California
Notice to dealers: This original is for your files. If spoiled in making out, do not destroy. Keep in books. Fill out in duplicate.
Carbon duplicate must be mailed on the evening of the day of sale, to head of police commissioners, chief of police, city marshal, town marshal or other head of the police department of the municipal corporations wherein the sale is made, or to the county clerk of your county if the sale is made in a district where there is no municipal police department. Violation of this law is a misdemeanor. Use carbon paper for duplicate.
Use indelible pencil.
Sold by _____________ Salesman ___________________
City, town or township _____________________________
Description of arm (state whether revolver or pistol) _____
Maker __________ number ____________ caliber _______
Name of purchaser ____________________ age ____ years.
Permanent residence (state name of city, town or township, Street and number of dwelling________________________
Height _______ feet _______ inches. Occupation ________
Color ______ skin_______ eyes_______ hair ____________
If traveling or in locality temporarily, give local address ____
Signature of purchaser ______________________________
(Signing a fictitious name or address is a misdemeanor.) (To be signed in duplicate.)
Witness _______________________ salesman.
(To be signed in duplicate.)
Series No. ______
Sheet No. ______
Duplicate.
Dealers’ Record of Sale of Revolver or Pistol.
State of California
Notice to dealers: This carbon duplicate must be mailed on the evening of the day of sale as set forth in the original of this register page. Violation of this law is a misdemeanor.
Sold by _____________ Salesman ___________________
City, town or township _____________________________
Description of arm (state whether revolver or pistol) _____
Maker __________ number ____________ caliber _______
Name of purchaser ____________________ age ____ years.
Permanent residence (state name of city, town or township, Street and number of dwelling________________________
Height _______ feet _______ inches. Occupation ________
Color ______ skin_______ eyes_______ hair ____________
If traveling or in locality temporarily, give local address ____
Signature of purchaser ______________________________
(Signing a fictitious name or address is a misdemeanor.) (To be signed in duplicate.)
Witness _______________________ salesman.
(To be signed in duplicate.)
Series No. ______
Sheet No. ______
Stats. 1917, c. 145 § 7. Thus, dealers submitted purchaser information to law enforcement by day’s end, with delivery possible immediately, as no waiting period existed.
Interestingly, a 1918 police report excerpt (preceding the first waiting period bill by 5 years and not referenced in the bill itself) was located, and appears to be the first call for the use a waiting period as a cooling off period: “The large number of crimes committed during the year by irresponsible people, particularly by bootleggers and pool-room hanger-on carrying dangerous weapons, emphasizes the need for increased police authority to regulate more strictly the sale of firearms of all kinds… There is great need… of a law which would make it necessary for every person to make written application to a dealer for the purchase of a firearm and the dealer should be prohibited from making delivery for at least 15 days after application is made. This period would give the police department time to inquire into the character of the prospective purchaser and, incidentally, give the prospective purchaser time to lose his fit of passion if he desires to purchase the revolver to harm anyone else” (Report of the Major and Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Department, July 1, 1918, pp. 77, 82–83).
This rational, however, was not the rational adopted as the statutory basis for enacting waiting periods until seventy years later, in 1988, when a judicially adopted false narrative was statutorily codified, more on that later. Instead, as the legislative histories note, the legislative purpose was always to prevent deliveries to “prohibited persons.”
California waited 73 years after statehood to impose its first waiting period law—Statutes 1923, c. 263, §§ 9–10, which repealed the 1917 act and regulated handguns more comprehensively. It prohibited same-day delivery of concealable firearms (long guns excluded), requiring at least a one-day delay:
Sec. 10. No person shall sell, deliver or otherwise transfer any pistol, revolver or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person to any person whom he has cause to believe to be within any of the classes prohibited by section two hereof from owning or possessing such firearms, nor to any minor under the age of eighteen years. In no event shall any such firearm be delivered to the purchaser upon the day of the application for the purchase thereof, and when delivered such firearm shall be securely wrapped and shall be unloaded. Where neither party to the transaction holds a dealer’s license, no person shall sell or otherwise transfer any such firearm to any other person within this state who is not personally known to the vendor. Any violation of this section is a misdemeanor.
The act also defined prohibited persons (felons, unnaturalized foreign-born individuals) and retained 1917 registration requirements (Sec. 9, identical to prior quote). Businesses faced license forfeiture for same-day deliveries or sales to prohibited persons (Sec. 11). The context suggests the intent was to allow law enforcement time to review records for prohibited status before delivery, facilitated by mailed Dealer Records of Sale (DROS).
In 1955, Assembly Bills 3508 and 3509 extended the same-day prohibition to a three-day waiting period for concealable firearms (Stats. 1955, c. 1521, § 1; c. 1522, § 1), amending Penal Code §§ 12071 and 12072. No legislative analysis or reasons were provided, suggesting the change addressed perceived inadequacies in check times.
In 1965, Assembly Bill 1564 extended the waiting period to five days (Stats. 1965, c. 1007, §§ 1–2), citing the need for more thorough background checks. A memo from Assembly Member Anthony Beilenson confirmed the bill was requested by the Attorney General for check purposes, once again indicating that the waiting period was to prevent prohibited persons from obtaining firearms and not for “cooling off.”
Later, a February 8, 1967, City of Los Angeles letter touting the waiting period claimed the period prevented a mentally ill person from obtaining a firearm.
In 1975, Assembly Bill 1441 extended the waiting period to 15 days (Stats. 1975, c. 997, §§ 1–2). Legislative records cite mail delays and high volumes (900+ daily requests, with 252 notifications daily) as reasons, with 15 days covering 95% of checks and 30 days for 100% (Senate Committee on Judiciary, 1975). Support came from the California Peace Officers Association (September 12, 1975), DOJ (March 5, 1975), and AG’s office (February 5, 1975). In People v. Daniels (222 Cal.App.3d 99, 100), a felon purchased a weapon and wasn’t approached for 27 days, highlighting enforcement delays.
The People v. Bickston case (91 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 29, 1979) is a pivotal moment in the legislative history of California’s firearm waiting period laws, as it introduced the concept of a “cooling-off” period as a presumed intent for the 15-day waiting period on private party transfers, despite the absence of clear legislative evidence supporting this interpretation in prior records.
Case Overview:
Statutory Context:
Court’s Analysis:
Why the Cooling-Off Intent Was Incorrectly Inferred:
The Bickston court’s erroneous inference of a cooling-off intent had a lasting impact by shifting the narrative from a purely administrative check-based delay to a dual-purpose policy, despite no primary legislative support before 1990. This “fabricated” intent is problematic because the 1923–1975 records consistently cite check times, with mail delays (3+ days) and volumes (e.g., 900+ requests in 1975) as drivers. The 1918 excerpt is the only early hint of cooling off, but its legislative relevance is unclear. But, as is detailed below, Bickston‘s error in citing cooling-off periods as a rationale for waiting periods becomes a driving force for more modern legislation.
Assembly Bill 3707 (Stats. 1988, c. 1180) codified Bickston and State v. Vasey, applying the 15-day wait to private handgun transfers, not for background checks (no DOJ reporting) but to align with DOJ opinions.
Assembly Bill 497 (Stats. 1990, c. 9, §§ 5–6) extended the 15-day wait to all firearms, mandated dealer processing for private sales, and reduced long gun waits to 10 days from 1996. It closed loopholes (e.g., no checks for long guns). A 1990 feasibility study suggested instant approvals were possible, with waits being a legislative choice (Assembly Member Lloyd Connelly’s Fact Sheet: “there is little value in simply making people wait 15 days if no background check is performed”). The “heat of passion” rationale for private transfers appeared, despite no prior evidence (Senate Rules Committee, February 5, 1990).
The 1991 DOJ study confirmed instant check feasibility, making extended waits unnecessary today.
In 1996, Senate Bill 671 reduced California’s handgun waiting period from 15 days to 10 days, effective April 1, 1997, aligning it with the 10-day wait for long guns set by Assembly Bill 497 (1990). The bill, codified as Stats. 1996, ch. 128, §§ 3–4, mandated an electronic Dealer’s Record of Sale (DROS) system to streamline background checks, replacing slow, mail-based processes that were used to justify longer waits. Legislative records, like the March 28, 1995, Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure report, cited the need for check time but also referenced a “cooling-off” period to prevent impulsive violence, particularly for handguns. This cooling-off rationale was mistakenly tied to the federal Brady Bill (1994), which required a temporary 5-day wait for checks (not cooling off) until the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) enabled instant checks in 1998. A July 11, 1995, Assembly Committee report noted that electronic DROS could reduce waits to three days, sufficient for checks and any incidental cooling-off effect. Senator Steve Peace’s June 20, 1996, letter called the 10-day wait “more than adequate” for cooling off, perpetuating the misconception from People v. Bickston (1979). In 1998, cleanup bills (AB 1871, SB 683, AB 2011) removed outdated 15-day references, finalizing the 10-day standard for all firearms. With instant NICS checks now standard, the 10-day wait exceeds what’s needed for safety or verification.
Assembly Bill 500, enacted in 2013, permits the California Department of Justice (DOJ) to delay firearm transfers for up to 30 days if a buyer’s eligibility remains unclear, as codified in Penal Code § 28220, despite the existence of advanced instant background check systems that render such delays unnecessary. This provision, intended to ensure thorough vetting for complex cases, allows the DOJ to extend the standard 10-day waiting period when standard checks—via the electronic Dealer’s Record of Sale (DROS) or the federal National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS)—fail to immediately confirm a buyer’s status, such as in cases involving incomplete records or potential matches with prohibited persons like felons or those with specific mental health adjudications.
However, modern technologies like DROS and NICS typically verify eligibility in seconds or minutes, processing millions of checks annually with high accuracy. AB 500’s 30-day delay, while designed to address edge cases, imposes an unwarranted burden on lawful buyers, as instant-check capabilities, including those for ammunition purchases under Proposition 63 (2016, Pen. Code § 30370), can resolve eligibility questions rapidly. This disconnect between the law’s cautious approach and current technological realities highlights how the 30-day rule is an outdated overreach, no longer necessary for ensuring public safety.
California’s 10-day wait is among the longest, with Hawaii at 14 days, D.C. at 10, and others (e.g., Florida, Illinois) at 3–7 days. Federal law allows transfers after three days if NICS is incomplete (Brady Act, 1994). Many states have no waits, relying on instant NICS, highlighting California’s outlier status.
Post-New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022), firearm regulations must align with historical traditions. California’s waiting period, starting in 1923, lacks analogs from the Founding era, making it vulnerable to challenges. A 2014 ruling (Silvester v. Harris) found the wait unconstitutional for existing owners, but was overturned on appeal; the Supreme Court declined review in 2018.
In 2024, the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC) filed Richards v. Bonta, arguing the 10-day wait violates Bruen’s text-and-history test, as no waiting period existed before 1923. The case is pending in the Southern District of California.
On August 19, 2025, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals preliminarily enjoined New Mexico’s 7-day waiting period in Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Grisham, finding it likely violates the Second Amendment under Bruen. The court rejected New Mexico’s arguments that sales restrictions don’t implicate the Second Amendment and dismissed historical analogs (e.g., racist gun laws) as unpersuasive, noting modern shipping/delivery delays don’t justify waits. This strengthens arguments against California’s longer wait, as both lack Founding-era precedents.
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