The Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Gator’s Custom Guns, Inc. (No. 102940-3, decided May 8, 2025) upholds the constitutionality of ESSB 5078, a Washington law banning the manufacture, import, distribution, or sale of large capacity magazines (LCMs), defined as ammunition feeding devices capable of holding more than 10 rounds. The majority reverses a superior court’s ruling that ESSB 5078 violates the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Washington Constitution, concluding that LCMs are neither “arms” under constitutional definitions nor necessary ancillary components for the right to bear arms in self-defense. A dissenting opinion by Justice Gordon McCloud argues that LCMs are protected “arms” under both constitutions and that the law lacks a historical analog, rendering it unconstitutional.
Analysis of the Opinion’s Flaws
The majority opinion is flawed for several reasons, as persuasively argued in the dissent and further elaborated below:
Mischaracterization of LCMs as Non-Arms The majority’s assertion that LCMs are not “arms” because they are mere “attachments” or “accessories” to firearms is overly narrow and inconsistent with precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570, 2008) defines “arms” broadly as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” LCMs, as integral components of semiautomatic firearms, facilitate the firearm’s function by feeding ammunition, directly contributing to its defensive capability. The majority’s claim that LCMs are not weapons because they do not “cast the round” (Majority at 10) is reductive, as it could equally disqualify triggers, grips, or firing pins—none of which independently “cast” rounds but are essential to a firearm’s operation. This parsing of components undermines Heller’s functional approach to “arms.”
Ignoring Common Use for Lawful Purposes The majority dismisses evidence that LCMs are commonly possessed, arguing that ownership statistics do not prove they are “commonly used for self-defense” (Majority at 12). This misapplies Heller and N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1, 2022), which protect arms “in common use” for lawful purposes, not exclusively self-defense. The dissent cites data showing that 48% of gun owners (approximately 39 million individuals) own LCMs, with 71% reporting defensive purposes (William English, 2021 National Firearms Survey). Federal courts, such as in Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights v. Lamont (685 F. Supp. 3d 63, 2023), have recognized LCMs as commonly used, yet the majority sidesteps this by demanding unspecified evidence of “use” while ignoring possession as a proxy for lawful purpose, as Heller permits (554 U.S. at 629).
Failure to Engage with Ancillary Rights The majority’s conclusion that the right to purchase LCMs is not an ancillary right necessary for self-defense is unconvincing. Federal precedent, such as Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco (746 F.3d 953, 2014), recognizes that restrictions on ammunition implicate the Second Amendment because they undermine the core right to bear arms. LCMs, while not required for every firearm, enhance the effectiveness of semiautomatic weapons, which are indisputably protected. By allowing restrictions on LCMs, the majority opens the door to regulating other “non-essential” components, eroding the right to bear arms through piecemeal restrictions (Dissent at 14-15).
Inconsistent Application of State Constitutional Protections The majority’s reliance on City of Seattle v. Evans (184 Wn.2d 856, 2015) to limit Article I, Section 24 to arms “designed as weapons” misaligns with the broader protections of the Washington Constitution. As the dissent notes, Article I, Section 24 explicitly protects the individual right to bear arms for both self-defense and defense of the state, unlike the Second Amendment’s militia-focused language (Dissent at 30-31). The majority’s narrow interpretation renders the “defense of the state” clause superfluous, violating principles of constitutional construction (State ex rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 138 Wn.2d 800, 1999). Furthermore, State v. Jorgenson (179 Wn.2d 145, 2013) applies an overly lenient intermediate scrutiny to a fundamental right, which the dissent argues should be subject to strict scrutiny, aligning with other fundamental rights like free exercise or privacy (Dissent at 31-32).
Avoidance of Historical Analog Analysis By concluding that LCMs are not protected, the majority avoids the Bruen requirement to identify a historical analog for the regulation. The dissent correctly notes that the State fails to provide relevant founding-era analogs, as the earliest magazine restrictions appeared in the Prohibition era, 150 years after the Second Amendment’s ratification (Dissent at 27). The State’s cited analogs (e.g., trap gun or Bowie knife regulations) are inapposite, as they regulated use or carry, not possession of a common arm (Dissent at 28). This failure undermines the law’s constitutionality under Bruen’s historical tradition test.
Extreme Examples of the Ruling’s Implications
The majority’s logic, if applied to other weapons or constitutional rights, leads to absurd and dangerous outcomes, illustrating the ruling’s overreach:
Swords with Handles That Last More Than Ten Swings Applying the majority’s reasoning to a sword, a historical “arm” under Heller, a state could ban sword handles designed to withstand more than ten swings, arguing they are not the “arm” itself but merely enhance the sword’s durability. A sword with a handle that breaks after ten swings is practically useless in prolonged combat or self-defense, rendering the right to bear such an arm ineffective. Just as LCMs enable a firearm’s repeated firing, a durable handle enables a sword’s sustained use. The majority’s component-based approach could thus justify stripping weapons of essential enhancements, gutting the right to bear arms.
Bows with Strings That Last More Than Ten Shots Consider a bow, another traditional “arm.” The majority’s logic would permit banning bowstrings designed to endure more than ten shots, claiming they do not “cast” the arrow but only facilitate the bow’s longevity. A bow with a string that snaps after ten shots is unreliable for defense or hunting, undermining its purpose. This parallels the majority’s dismissal of LCMs as non-essential, ignoring their role in making semiautomatic firearms effective for self-defense or state defense.
Free Speech Without a Platform Extending the majority’s reasoning to the First Amendment, a state could ban social media platforms or printing presses as “accessories” to free speech, arguing they are not speech itself. Without a means to disseminate speech effectively, the right becomes hollow, much like a firearm without an LCM is less effective. The majority’s failure to protect ancillary rights, like purchasing LCMs, sets a precedent for eroding other rights by targeting their practical mechanisms.
Voting Without Polling Places The majority’s logic could justify restricting access to polling places, claiming they are not the “right” to vote but merely facilitate it. Without polling places, voting becomes impractical for many, undermining the right’s core purpose. This mirrors the majority’s dismissal of LCMs as non-essential, ignoring how restrictions on enabling components can effectively nullify a constitutional guarantee.
Why the Opinion is Wrong
The majority opinion is wrong because it adopts an artificially narrow definition of “arms,” disregards the widespread use of LCMs for lawful purposes, and fails to honor the broader protections of the Washington Constitution. By treating LCMs as mere accessories, the court risks setting a precedent that could justify banning other critical components of weapons or mechanisms of other rights, as shown by the extreme examples above. The dismissal of ownership evidence as irrelevant to “use” contradicts Heller’s focus on possession for lawful purposes, and the avoidance of Bruen’s historical analysis evades the State’s burden to justify the regulation. The dissent’s robust defense of LCMs as protected arms, grounded in precedent and the practical realities of firearm use, exposes the majority’s logical and legal missteps. If left unchecked, this ruling could erode constitutional protections by allowing governments to chip away at rights through their enabling components or platforms.
Urgent Need for U.S. Supreme Court Review
This ruling underscores the urgent need for the U.S. Supreme Court to take up cases like Wolford v. Lopez (No. 23-1107, cert. pending) and Snope v. U.S. (No. 24-100, cert. pending), which address similar restrictions on firearm components and Second Amendment protections. In Wolford, the Ninth Circuit upheld Hawaii’s ban on certain firearms and magazines, raising questions about the scope of “arms” and historical analogs under Bruen. In Snope, the petitioner challenges a federal regulation on firearm accessories, highlighting the patchwork of state and federal restrictions that threaten Second Amendment rights. The Gator’s Custom Guns decision, with its narrow interpretation of “arms” and failure to apply Bruen’s historical test, exemplifies the inconsistent application of Second Amendment precedent across jurisdictions. Supreme Court clarification is critical to resolve whether firearm components like LCMs are protected “arms” and to ensure that states cannot sidestep constitutional guarantees by targeting ancillary components, as this ruling permits. Without such guidance, the right to bear arms risks being hollowed out through incremental restrictions, as illustrated by the extreme examples above.
