AMENDED OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge.

The General Store appeals the district court’s grant of sum-

mary judgment upholding the revocation of The General

Store’s federal firearms dealer license for willful violations of

federal and state firearms laws. This appeal gives us occasion,

following the Supreme Court’s decision in Safeco Insurance

Company of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2201

(2007), to consider the definition of “willfully” in the Gun

Control Act of 1968, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930. We

hold that the violations were willful and therefore affirm the

revocation of The General Store’s federal firearms license.

THE GENERAL STORE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 07-35417 

v.

D.C. No.

RICHARD VAN LOAN, Director of CV-06-00103-FVS 

Industry Operations, Seattle Field

Division, Bureau of Alcohol

Tobacco and Firearms, ATF,

Defendant-Appellee.

AMENDED OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Fred L. Van Sickle, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 22, 2008—Seattle, Washington

Filed December 31, 2008

Amended March 31, 2009

Before: Barry G. Silverman, M. Margaret McKeown and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

COUNSEL

Richard E. Gardiner (argued), Fairfax, Virginia, for appellant.

James A. McDevitt, U.S. Attorney, Rolf H. Tangvald

(argued), Assistant U.S. Attorney, Spokane, Washington, for

appellee.

BACKGROUND

The General Store is an aptly named retailer in Spokane,

Washington. The General Store maintains a federal firearms

dealers license in order to sell, among its many wares, fire-

arms and ammunition.

The Gun Control Act of 1968 and related regulations

impose certain requirements on federal firearms licensees.

Two provisions are pertinent to this appeal. First, the Gun

Control Act specifies record keeping requirements, including

maintaining “such records of importation, production, ship-

ment, receipt, sale, or other disposition of firearms at [the]

place of business for such period, and in such form, as the

Attorney General may by regulations prescribe.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 923(g)(1)(A). The regulations, in turn, prescribe that

licensed firearms dealers must “enter into a record each

receipt and disposition of firearms.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.125(e).

The regulations include a form for the record—commonly

called an Acquisition and Disposition Record—that requires

specific information be gathered and recorded. See id. Sec-

ond, licensed firearms dealers may not conduct transactions

that violate state law. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2). For example,

Washington law requires that firearms dealers send a copy of

all handgun applications “to the chief of police of the munici-

pality or the sheriff of the county of which the purchaser is a

resident.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.090(5). Under the licens-

ing provisions of the Gun Control Act, the Attorney General

has the authority to “revoke any license issued under this sec-

tion if the holder of such license has willfully violated” any

provision of the Act or the related regulations. 18 U.S.C.

§ 923(e).

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

(“ATF”), as well as state officials, periodically sends letters

to all firearms dealers with information about federal and state

laws and instructions for compliance. Two such letters pre-

ceded the violations at issue here. In November 1998, the

3860 THE GENERAL STORE v. VAN LOAN

ATF issued an Open Letter to All Washington Federal Fire-

arms Licensees regarding compliance with the permanent pro-

visions of the Brady Law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(t). The letter

instructed licensees “to contact the chief law enforcement

officer in the jurisdiction of the purchaser’s residence, in

accordance with State law requirements” to conduct back-

ground checks for handgun transactions. An undated follow-

up letter, labeled a “Correction Notice,” clarified a point

about concealed pistol licenses and reaffirmed the Brady Act

requirement that: “[l]icensees should continue to contact the

chief law enforcement officer in the jurisdiction of the pur-

chaser’s residence to request a background check for handgun

purchasers who do not have any concealed pistol license.”

In 2000, the ATF inspected The General Store and issued

a Report of Violations. The ATF cited The General Store for

three separate record keeping violations and, most notably,

one violation of the receipt and disposition requirement, 27

C.F.R. § 478.125(e).1 The subsection (e) violation was

because “[o]ne firearm acquisition and 185 dispositions were

not recorded . . . [l]icensee used sale date, not actual transfer

date for dispositions recording some dispositions prior to

actual transfer . . . [and] [l]icensee failed to record actual date

of receipt of firearms.” The ATF instructed The General Store

to “establish controls to ensure all future entries are correct”

no later than May 19, 2000. Following the inspection, the

ATF held a warning conference on June 16, 2000, in which

representatives met with William Barany, The General Store’s

president, “to discuss the manner in which [The General

Store] plan[s] to prevent these violations from re-occurring.”

The ATF next inspected The General Store in 2001 and

issued a Report of Violations on October 15, 2001. The ATF

cited The General Store for violations of 27 C.F.R. § 478.44,

§ 478.99, § 478.124, and § 478.125(e). Significantly, there

was a “Repeat Violation” of § 478.125(e) for one unlogged

firearm that was leaning against The General Store’s counter;

it was a customer’s gun obtained for repair. The ATF required

the following corrective action:

Immediately record all acquisition information on

firearms that have remained on premises overnight.

Implement internal controls as was discussed during

the June 16, 2000 warning conference. Firearms

acquired for gunsmithing, repairs, sights, or any

other reason should be recorded by some one [sic] or

in some way so that firearms returned or otherwise

disposed on a different business day can be recorded,

as required by the Gun Control Act.

1

The ATF’s Report of Violations cites to 27 C.F.R. § 178.124 and

§ 178.125; the ATF regulations have since moved from 27 C.F.R. § 178

et seq. to 27 C.F.R. § 478 et seq. without change.

After the 2001 inspection, The General Store began using

a commercially-printed “Firearms Repair Log” to track fire-

arms acquired for repair. The instruction to “BE SURE TO

LOG IN ALL FIREARMS RECEIVED FOR REPAIR AND

LOG THEM OUT ON DELIVERY” is written in large font

diagonally across the front cover of the Firearms Repair Log.

In smaller font, at the bottom of the front cover, is another

written instruction:

IMPORTANT DELIVERY INFORMATION:

If any firearm logged into this Gunsmith’s Firearms

Repair Log is delivered to anyone other than the per-

son who brought it in for repair, an entry MUST be

made in your permanent Firearms Acquisition and

Disposition Book (“Bound Book”), and a Form 4473

filled out and filed just as though the gun had been

sold. Note in the “Date Returned” column of this

book for the gun being delivered to see the entry in

the Acquisition and Disposition Book for the person

delivered to. See the example on the back cover of

this Repair Log.

The ATF inspected The General Store yet again in January

2003. Finding more violations, Richard Van Loan (“Van

Loan”), Director of Industry Operations for the Seattle Field

Division of the ATF, issued a Notice of Revocation of The

General Store’s federal firearms license on August 6, 2004.

The General Store received an administrative hearing in early

2005. Van Loan issued the Final Notice of Revocation of

Firearms License, with his findings and conclusions, on Feb-

ruary 16, 2006. Van Loan based the final revocation on the

following five violations:

(1) Willful violation of 27 C.F.R. § 478.125 for

failure to adequately maintain an Acquisition

and Disposition Record for firearms acquired

for repair.

(2) Willful violation of 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1) and

27 C.F.R. § 478.125 for failure to fully record

the “source” of acquired firearms.

(3) Willful violation of 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1) and

27 C.F.R. § 478.125 for failure to log eighty

missing or stolen firearms in its Acquisition

and Disposition Record.

(4) Willful violation of 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1) and

27 C.F.R. § 478.125 for failure to log seventeen

firearms that were lost or stolen, then ulti-

mately recovered and resold.

(5) Willful violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2) for

failure to comply with state law, specifically

Revised Code of Washington § 9.41.090,

which requires the dealer to send a copy of all

handgun applications to the chief of police or

sheriff of the purchaser’s place of residence.

The General Store filed a timely petition for “de novo judi-

cial review” in district court as provided by 18 U.S.C.

§ 923(f)(3). The General Store requested that Van Loan stay

the revocation pending judicial review pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 923(f)(2) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.78; Van Loan denied the

request. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district

court upheld the first and fifth violations, and the revocation

of The General Store’s license.

ANALYSIS

I. DEFINITION OF “WILLFULLY” UNDER THE GUN CONTROL

ACT

[1] In evaluating The General Store’s admitted violations,

the district court looked to the definition of “willfully” set out

in Perri v. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms: “when a dealer understands the

requirements of the law, but knowingly fails to follow them

or was indifferent to them.” 637 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.

1981). The General Store argues that this interpretation is

inconsistent with the definition of “willfully” recently articu-

lated by the Supreme Court in Safeco. 127 S. Ct. at 2208-09.

[2] Safeco considers “willfully” in the context of the Fair

Credit Reporting Act. The Court reiterated that “[w]here will-

fulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have gen-

erally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a

standard, but reckless ones as well[.]” 127 S.Ct. at 2208. This

clear directive leaves us to decide whether there is a distinc-

tion between “reckless disregard” as articulated in Safeco and

the term “indifference” as used in Perri. Although at oral

argument The General Store’s counsel likened this distinction

to considering how many angels fit on the head of a pin, pars-

ing this language does not require us to make such a meta-

physical judgment. We interpret “indifference” as used in

Perri to mean “plain indifference,” which is indistinguishable

from a “reckless” violation.

Although Perri’s recitation of the indifference standard did

not include the modifier “plain,” the two cases referenced for

3864 THE GENERAL STORE v. VAN LOAN

support cite “plain indifference” and, in the context of Perri,

it is clear that “indifference” did not mean a mere mistake or

negligence. See 637 F.2d at 1336 (citing Lewin v. Blumenthal,

590 F.2d 268, 269 (8th Cir. 1979); Shyda v. Director, Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 448 F. Supp. 409, 415

(M.D. Pa. 1977)). Instead, “indifference” as used in Perri is

the same as “reckless disregard,” which means “[c]onscious

indifference to the consequences of an act.” Black’s Law Dic-

tionary 506 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).

[3] Five circuits, in addition to ours, have similarly held

that a violation of the Gun Control Act requires a willful vio-

lation that is “a deliberate, knowing, or reckless violation of

its requirements.” Armalite Inc. v. Lambert, 544 F.3d 644,

647 (6th Cir. 2008); RSM, Inc. v. Herbert, 466 F.3d 316, 321

(4th Cir. 2006); Willingham Sports, Inc. v. ATF, 415 F.3d

1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005); Stein’s Inc. v. Blumenthal, 649

F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1980); Lewin v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d

268, 269 (8th Cir. 1979). In Armalite, the Sixth Circuit

recently noted that the classic definition of willfulness—

knowing or reckless, but not negligent—is consistent with the

“standard civil usage” reference in Safeco. Armalite, 544 F.3d

at 648 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There

is no distinction of consequence between the definitions of

“willfully” in Perri and Safeco. Therefore, the district court

did not err by applying the Perri standard to The General

Store’s revocation proceeding.

The General Store also urges us to disregard Perri because,

when Perri was decided, § 923(e) did not include a require-

ment of willfulness. Congress added the willfulness proviso in

the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986. Pub. L. 99-308,

100 Stat. 449 (1986). Thus, according to The General Store,

the legislative history dictates that “willfully” must be inter-

preted to mean purposeful, intentional conduct. We are not

persuaded by this argument. Perri used the term “willfully,”

so the statutory change simply conformed the statutory lan-

guage to our case law. Because the statute as amended is

unambiguous, there is no need to look beyond the face of the

statute itself, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450

(2002), interpreted in light of the traditional standard that

applies where “willfulness is a statutory condition of civil lia-

bility.” Safeco, 127 S.Ct. at 2208.

2. II.WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE GUN CONTROL ACT
   

The General Store argues that its admitted violations of 27

C.F.R. § 478.125(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2) were not

“willful” and therefore cannot be a basis for revocation of its

firearms license. Although we affirm the district court’s deci-

sion that both violations were willful, one willful violation

would be sufficient, as a single willful violation is grounds for

upholding the revocation.

The regulation requires licensed firearms dealers to “enter

into a record each receipt and disposition of firearms.” 27

C.F.R. § 478.125(e). The General Store admits that it violated

this requirement by failing to record firearms shipped to and

returned from manufacturers and gunsmiths for repair in its

Acquisition and Disposition Record. The General Store

argues, however, that these violations were not willful

because it made a good faith effort to follow ambiguous

instructions received from the ATF.

These instructions, however, were not so ambiguous as The

General Store would have us believe. Following inspections

in 2000 and 2001, ATF cited The General Store for violations

of § 478.125(e). Both citations instructed The General Store

to record acquisitions and dispositions of firearms for repair

“as required by the Gun Control Act” with reference to

§ 478.125(e), which contains specific instructions on what

information must be recorded. Nothing was unclear in the

citations.

[4] Nonetheless, The General Store points to two supposed

ambiguities in the instructions it received for complying with

its record keeping duties. First, the citation following the 2001

inspection instructed The General Store to record firearms

acquired for repair “in some way.” On its own, this remark

may not be the clearest directive, but it is not ambiguous

when combined with the instruction to record firearms “as

required by the Gun Control Act” and § 478.125(e). Sec-

tion 478.125(e) provides specific information about recording

acquisitions that removes any ambiguity about The General

Store’s record keeping duties.

Second, in an apparent attempt to comply with its record

keeping duties following the 2001 inspection, The General

Store began using a commercially-printed Firearms Repair

Log to track firearms acquired for repair. The Firearms Repair

Log has two instructions on its cover that the General Store

views as ambiguous. “BE SURE TO LOG IN ALL FIRE-

ARMS RECEIVED FOR REPAIR AND LOG THEM OUT

ON DELIVERY” is printed in large type. The cover also

warns,

If any firearm logged into this Gunsmith’s Firearms

Repair Log is delivered to anyone other than the per-

son who brought it in for repair, an entry MUST be

made in your permanent Firearms Acquisition and

Disposition Book (“Bound Book”), and a Form 4473

filled out and filed just as though the gun had been

sold.

The General Store argues that this warning paragraph modi-

fies the “log in all firearms” instruction, which therefore

applies only to firearms delivered to “anyone other than the

person who brought it in for repair.”

The General Store’s reliance on the Firearms Repair Log is

misplaced. The General Store must follow the record keeping

requirements “as the Attorney General may by regulations

prescribe,” 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A), not the instructions

printed on a commercial publication that it chooses to use.

[5] But, in any event, the instructions in the Firearms

Repair Log are not ambiguous. The two separate instructions

are independent: the instruction to “log in all firearms” is

printed in larger font diagonally across the page. The warning,

which is separate and contained in smaller print at the bottom

of the page, by its own terms applies only to firearms that

have already been logged into the Firearms Repair Log; the

warning does not modify the obligation to log the firearms in

the first instance.

[6] Finally, we question the consistency of The General

Store’s good faith effort to comply with § 478.125(e). By

beginning to use the Firearms Repair Log after the 2001

inspection, The General Store demonstrated some effort to

meet its obligations. But § 478.125(e) requires licensees to

maintain, not just start, accurate firearms logs. An initial use

of a log in 2001, followed by two years of inaccurate or

incomplete records leading up to the 2003 inspection, demon-

strates The General Store’s indifference to its legal obligation.

Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that The

General Store willfully violated § 478.125(e).

The district court also determined that The General Store

violated § 922(b)(2), which prohibits firearms sales that vio-

late state law, by failing to comply with a Washington

requirement that firearms dealers must send a copy of all

handgun applications to the police or sheriff of the applicant’s

place of residence. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.090(5).

Instead of following this requirement, The General Store sub-

mitted copies of handgun applications to the Spokane Police

Department, regardless of the applicant’s residence. The Gen-

eral Store contends that its admitted violation of § 922(b)(2)

was not willful because The General Store did not know its

obligation and had “reasonable cause to believe that the pur-

chase . . . would not be in violation of such State law.” 18

U.S.C. § 922(b)(2).

[7] The General Store does not dispute that the form it used

for processing handgun applications unambiguously states,

“[s]end this original to the Chief of Police of the municipality

or the Sheriff of the county of which the purchaser is a resi-

dent.” In addition, the district court found that The General

Store received written notice of the requirement in the letters

sent by the ATF in 1998.2 The evidence supports the district

court’s determination that The General Store knew its obliga-

tions under § 922(b)(2).

[8] The General Store also argues that it had “reasonable

cause to believe that the purchase . . . would not be in viola-

tion of such State law,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2), because nei-

ther the ATF nor the Spokane Police Department informed

The General Store that it was sending the forms to the wrong

official. This argument is not persuasive. The dealer, not the

ATF or the police department, bears the reporting obligation.

The ATF’s failure to cite every violation during prior

inspections—particularly when faced with a large number of

missing firearms—and the Spokane Police Department’s inac-

tion do not demonstrate a good faith belief given The General

Store’s repeated failure to follow a clear duty. The district

court did not err in finding that The General Store violated

§ 922(b)(2).

3. III.JURISDICTION TO STAY REVOCATION
   

Finally, The General Store argues that 18 U.S.C.

§ 923(f)(2) required Van Loan to stay revocation of The Gen-

eral Store’s federal firearms license pending judicial review.

Because we affirm the district court’s revocation of The Gen-

eral Store’s license, this contention is moot.

2

The General Store argues that there is no evidence it received these let-

ters. The district court credited Van Loan’s determination—based on the

common law mailbox rule—that The General Store received the letters.

Significantly, The General Store has never denied receiving the letters. Cf.

Schikore v. BankAmerica Supplemental Retirement Plan, 269 F.3d 956,

964 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting a “specific factual denial of receipt,”

under Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1995),

may in some contexts be sufficient to rebut a presumption of receipt based

on the mailbox rule). The district court’s factual finding is not clear error.

AFFIRMED.

3870 THE GENERAL STORE v. VAN LOAN